INTRODUCTION
The electricity sector has been subject to major structural changes during the last decade. Liberalization policies all over the world have led to a separation of formerly vertically integrated monopolies into three parts: production, retail and network services.
Competition has been introduced at the production and retail levels, although most markets remain highly concentrated and incumbent firms often
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continue to be dominant. This is the case in most European and U.S. electricity markets.
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Competition at the level of network services is not feasible, as it is inefficient to build and operate multiple parallel networks. These network assets are therefore essential facilities whose efficient allocation is crucial for a wellfunctioning upstream (production) and downstream (retail) market. Regulation generally requires that access to the essential facility be organized in such a way that it is non-discriminatory and market-based (i.e. no rationing). This implies that price arbitrage becomes possible, and that it is harder for the incumbent generation firm to price discriminate. This paper studies the welfare effect of a change towards a more market-conform allocation of essential facilities in the electricity sector, while at the same time keeping market structure (ownership) constant.
The classical models of third-degree price discrimination suggest that arbitrage generally improves welfare, as long as the incumbent does not significantly restrict supply in response to arbitrage. We show that these models cannot be applied to the electricity sector, as they do not allow for production-cost differences across regions in combination with limited transportation capacity.
In the electricity market, transmission capacity allows for two functions: it enables both price arbitrage by consumers and production-cost minimization by the incumbent. It is the interaction of these two (sometimes conflicting) functions of transmission capacity which lead to the counter-intuitive welfare results of our paper.
In the absence of price arbitrage, the monopolist will use the entire transmission capacity and shift as much of his production as possible to the lowcost region. Production costs are minimized, and the monopolist uses regional price discrimination. As there is no competition for accessing the transmission line, the price for transmission is zero.
In the presence of arbitrage, arbitrageurs trade electricity from the lowprice to the high-price region. In the high-price region, the incumbent generator loses market share to the arbitrageurs and therefore lowers the price. In the low-price region, the incumbent gains market size and raises the price. Hence, arbitrage reduces the regional price differential.
Apart from a possible effect on total supply, the welfare effect of a reduction of the regional price difference consists of two parts: it improves allocational efficiency among consumers, and it decreases production efficiency, as relatively more will be produced in the high-cost region. We show that it is likely that the negative effect outweighs the positive one. The introduction of market mechanisms for the allocation of essential facilities (e.g. auctioning) therefore only makes sense in the following situations: (1) when sufficient investment is 1. The European Commission has voiced serious concerns about the potential exercise of market power by incumbent companies (European Commission, 2006) . In 2000 the U.S. Department of Energy concludes: "...market power can be profitably exploited in some parts of the United States. ... firms can employ a simple market power bidding strategy to cut output and increase net revenues from generation by driving up the market price of electricity." (U.S. Department of Energy, 2000) . made in transmission capacities or (2) when the market power of the incumbent is broken in at least one of the two markets. If transmission capacity is sufficiently large, then regional cost differences do not matter, and arbitrage eliminates the incumbent's ability to price discriminate. Furthermore, more competitive markets eliminate the conflict between allocational and production efficiency, and arbitrage improves both.
The results of this paper are relevant for evaluating liberalized electricity markets in Europe and elsewhere. Even though most electricity markets have a market structure that is more oligopolistic than monopolistic, important conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, often the incumbent generator remains dominant, while other firms can be considered to be competitive fringes. Our results straightforwardly extend to such markets. Secondly, we are confident that the main intuition of our paper remains valid in oligopolistic markets: firms might be willing to reduce production efficiency, in order to extract rents from consumers by regional price arbitrage. This result is more likely to hold in cases where each firm has production plants on both ends of a transmission line and therefore faces similar incentives. Thirdly, oligopolistic models of electricity markets are not yet developed to a stage where they can provide sufficient insights in the electricity market. Robust results are only derived in models that neglect that firms create congestion intentionally. Instead it is assumed that firms are price takers in the transmission market. We therefore have to rely on monopolistic models for general results. This last point will be discussed further in the literature review.
The welfare effects which we discuss in this paper are economically significant as chronically congested transmission lines can be found worldwide. This is the case both in Europe and the United States: of the 39 cross-border connections in mainland Europe, 24 are congested more than 75 percent of the time, and only five connections are never congested (Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity, 2007) . Transmission congestion also arises in many U.S. areas, particularly within the U.S. Eastern connection system, where we often observe congestion from the West (areas with cheap coal plants) to the East (U.S. Department of Energy, 2006, p. 43) .
Furthermore, the welfare effects are larger, the larger regional production cost differences are. Production costs for electricity vary greatly across regions because of political constraints (for instance, acceptance of nuclear power plants), geographical constraints (wind-and water power production) and environmental constraints.
2 The welfare effects can therefore not be neglected. The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2 positions our contribution in the literature on third-degree price discrimination. Section 3 describes the model and Section 4 discusses for different allocation mechanisms, the optimal behavior of the monopolist. The paper then discusses the welfare effects and concludes.
RELATED LITERATURE
This paper discusses regional price discrimination in electricity markets. Third-degree price discrimination occurs when a monopolist is able to charge different prices to different markets or groups of consumers for a homogeneous good. The standard price discrimination model, where trade is costless and production costs are uniform, has been studied extensively in the literature. In this section, we review this literature and show that the results do not always hold for the electricity sector, which is characterized by inter-regional production-cost differences and limited transmission capacity.
One of the main insights in the literature (Tirole, 1988) is that the welfare effect of arbitrage is the combination of two effects: an allocational effect and an output effect. Costless arbitrage guarantees equal prices across regions, as consumers take advantage of any interregional price difference. Therefore, trade among consumers results in an efficient allocation of the good, given that the marginal valuation of an additional unit is the same across consumers. This is the allocational effect of arbitrage. At the same time, the monopolist may react by increasing or decreasing total output under the effect of arbitrage. This is the output effect. A positive output effect increases welfare. The total welfare effect is the sum of both effects: arbitrage increases allocational efficiency, but at the same time it might induce a strategic response of the monopolist, thereby decreasing output efficiency.
For linear demand (and constant marginal production costs), Robinson (1933) shows that the output effect is zero. In this case, price discrimination should be forbidden, as output is not allocated efficiently. Also for the linear demand case, Layson (1988) shows graphically that price discrimination is most harmful for society when it is most profitable for the monopolist, as the welfare loss is proportional to the profit gain from price discrimination.
3 Results are less clear-cut for non-linear demand. However, if the output effect can be shown to be positive, then the welfare effect will be positive. Robinson (1933) shows that in the standard price-discrimination model, the output effect of arbitrage depends on the curvature of the two demand curves. She shows that when demand is convex in the high-priced market and concave in the low-priced market, the output effect is positive. Also, if both curves are strictly concave, the output effect is positive when the low-priced market is more concave.
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Arbitrage might increase welfare even when the output effect is negative. In the literature there are no simple guidelines as to the total welfare effect of 3. Schmalensee (1981) generalizes this result for n independent markets with arbitrary demand function curvatures and constant marginal costs. He shows that a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for social welfare-improving price-discrimination is that total output increases compared to the non-discriminatory situation.
4. Formally, the low-priced region has, in absolute terms, a larger 'adjusted concavity' E = -qp'' (q) / p'(q), where p(q) is the inverse demand function. Robinson's criterion for determining the output effect is derived for infinitesimally small price changes. Shih et al. (1988) derive more general conditions for the sign of the total output effect.
arbitrage. Total welfare effects of price discrimination (with no distinction made between the output-and allocational effect) were studied by Varian (1985) , who derives upper and lower bounds of the effect of price discrimination in terms of changes in market prices and output. Malueg (1993) quantifies the relative size of the welfare change caused by third-degree price discrimination. For concave demand functions, he shows, for instance, that with price discrimination, welfare will never decrease more than 33 percent and never increase more than 150 percent.
Our paper shows that the results of the standard literature on thirddegree price discrimination cannot always be applied to the electricity sector. The differences and similarities with the classical model are the following:
We demonstrate that the welfare effect of arbitrage is the combination of three factors. As in the standard model, there is an allocational effect and an output effect, but there is also a new effect: the production efficiency effect, which requires that the goods are produced in the low-cost region. Arbitrage will typically improve allocational efficiency, but will reduce production efficiency.
With linear demand functions, we derive that the output effect of arbitrage is zero, as in previous literature, but that arbitrage will not always increase welfare. Arbitrage decreases welfare when production cost differences are larger than the difference in the consumers' willingness to pay (the regional price difference).
With concave demand functions, adjusted concavity determines the output effect. For transmission capacities close to zero, arbitrage increases total output when the demand in the low-price region is more concave than in the high-price region, where concavity is measured as in Robinson (1933) . Hence, the sign of the output effect is identical to that in the standard third-degree pricediscrimination model.
Finally, instead of defining upper-and lower bounds for welfare changes, we derive sufficient conditions for a positive welfare effect of arbitrage. These conditions depend on a combination of the curvature of the demand functions (which determines the output effect), the elasticity of the demand functions (which determines the regional dead-weight loss) and the price-cost margin (which links allocational and production efficiency).
The discussion in our paper is linked to three strands of literature. The first concerns the presence of imperfect arbitrage in models with price discrimination. The second is related to the literature on parallel imports. The third deals with the abuse of market power in electricity markets.
Several authors have introduced imperfect arbitrage in pricediscrimination models. When there are transaction costs or when goods are not perfectly homogeneous, arbitrage might lead to "leakage" of products from one market to another without eliminating the price difference completely. The monopolist can charge different prices in both regions, but if there is a price difference, then some of his production will leak from the low-price region to the high-price region. In this context, Varian (1985) derives a general model where sales by the monopolist might depend on the prices charged in both regions. Wright (1993) looks at a special type of imperfect arbitrage: arbitrageurs have to pay a fixed arbitrage cost. Our paper is different from this literature, as we look at imperfect arbitrage that is caused by limited transmission capacity combined with regional production-cost differences.
Parallel imports occur when traders buy a good in one country, and resell it in another, although they are not authorized distributors in the country they sell. One part of the literature on parallel trade studies its effect on the ability of the monopolist to price discriminate and the welfare implications. 5 Malueg and Schwartz (1994) show that parallel trade reduces the ability of firms to price discriminate, but that overall welfare decreases if demand dispersion among countries is large. Uniform pricing avoids output miss-allocation, but too many markets might be unserved. Hence, Malueg and Schwartz apply the standard third degree price-discrimination model to the trade literature, and discuss the trade-off between the output and the allocation effect. In our paper, we show that not only differences in demand matter, but also regional differences in production costs. Ahmadi and Yang (2000) look at a model of parallel imports where arbitrage is imperfect because consumers value the sales of the authorized seller higher than they value the goods from the unauthorized re-seller. This could be the result of different packaging or warranty conditions, for example. They show that in this case, it might be profitable for the monopolist to have some parallel trade, as it helps him to price discriminate consumers on the basis of their valuation of the (perceived) quality of the goods. In their model, it is as if consumers incur an 'adaptation cost' if they buy goods from resellers. In our model not the consumers, but the producer incurs an extra cost, as parallel trade might shift production from a low cost to a high cost region. This changes the incentives of the monopolist and therefore also the overall results. Knox and Richardson (2002) show that a monopolist might prefer allowing parallel trade, as it gives the importing country an incentive to lower its import tariff. For the monopolist the lower import tariffs might outweigh the loss of its ability to price discriminate. Our model is different as we do not have a government-administrated tariff for using the transmission line. Instead, the price for accessing the line is driven by market forces. We therefore have no regulatory feedback on transmission prices.
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The current paper also contributes to the discussion in the electricity sector on the interaction between transmission and energy markets. Joskow and Tirole (2000) and Gilbert et al. (2004) model the micro-structure of the transmission-rights market. Assuming that the transmission line is always 5. Another part addresses the compliance of firms with intellectual property rights and the incentives of the authorized dealers to invest in quality, such as the marketing of the good (Valletti and Szymanski, 2006) . 6. In a related paper, Richardson (2002) studies why small countries, which are likely to loose from the introduction of parallel imports, nevertheless choose to introduce it. He derives a model for which allowing parallel imports is a Nash equilibrium. congested, they show that the auction design determines whether arbitrage is perfect or not. Each type of auction therefore has a different impact on welfare. The focus of our current paper is different. While they assume generators to be located at one end of the line, we assume production capacity at both ends, which allows us to understand the effect of production-cost differences. We do not study auction design, however, as we consider only two extreme cases namely, perfect arbitrage and no arbitrage.
7 Borenstein et al. (2000) discuss a Cournot generation duopoly. They assume that each player has production in one of the regions, and that arbitrage is perfect. Insufficient transmission capacity decreases the competition in electricity market. Our paper is different, as we study the impact of arbitrage. Smeers and Wei (1997) and Hobbs and Rijkers (2005) develop numerical oligopoly models of the electricity market. In order to obtain robust simulation results, these models neglect the fact that firms can create congestion intentionally. Instead, it is assumed that firms are price takers in the transmission market. These models therefore underestimate the likely effects on market power. Neuhoff et al. (2005) discuss the different assumptions that one can make to model transmission constraints in oligopoly models when firms strategically create congestion. It is shown that existence and uniqueness of pure strategy equilibria is no longer guaranteed, and that advanced computational algorithms are needed to determine those equilibria. Such models are therefore only practical in a case-by-case simulation, but not to derive general insights in the market.
In some electricity markets, a dominant generator owns (part of) the transmission network. Pepermans and Willems (2006) show that in such markets, when access to the transmission network is imperfectly regulated, competition in the generation sector will be hampered. In our paper we do not study crossownership structures.
A long-term version of our model, where new transmission capacity can be built at a fixed long-term marginal investment cost, is studied by Willems (2004) .
MODEL DESCRIPTION
This section presents a formal model on the effect of arbitrage in the electricity sector. It extends the standard third-degree price discrimination model, assuming that interregional transmission capacity is small, and that each region has different production costs. 7. Hence, we assume that with arbitrage the transmission price equals the regional electricity price difference. This happens when transmission access is sold in a uniform first-price auction (Joskow and Tirole, 2000) or when arbitrage is imposed by market design.
8. Transmission capacity is "small" when, independent of the access regime, the transmission line is congested. Note, however, that we neglect production constraints and assume constant marginal production costs.
We compare two access regimes for the allocation of transmission capacity. In the first regime, the no-arbitrage regime (NA), we assume that the incumbent remains the only user of the transmission line. Arbitrageurs find it difficult or impossible to buy transmission capacity to profit from arbitrage on regional price differences. This might happen, for instance, when the incumbent owns the transmission capacity and access to the transmission line is inadequately regulated, or when the incumbent sells power with a resale restriction, forbidding consumers to resell their electricity and thereby drying up the liquidity on the energy markets. In the second regime, the arbitrage regime (A), the monopolist has to share the transmission line with arbitrageurs. Arbitrageurs buy transmission capacity and trade electricity from the low-price to the high-price region, until the price for transmission equals the price difference between the two regions. This occurs when access to the transmission line is auctioned efficiently and each region has a well-functioning energy market. Some regional power exchanges go even further by collaborating and setting up trading systems that by design eliminate arbitrage opportunities, given the technical constraints of the system. This is called market coupling in Europe. A similar system is used in the PJM power market, which covers 13 states in the U.S. and delivers power to about 50 Million people.
Note that Arbitrage (A) and No-arbitrage (NA) are two extreme cases. Arbitrage could be hampered even when transmission capacity is auctioned. This might happen if "gate closure", the moment when final bids have to be submitted in the auction, is different for the transmission market and the two power markets. If arbitrageurs need to buy transmission capacity before the electricity price is known, their risk increases, and arbitrage becomes less easy.
Formal Model
Consider two regions i ∈{1,2}. In each region there are price-taking consumers, represented by a downward-sloping and concave demand function q i (p). The model assumes that the incumbent player is a "first mover" that has three decision variables in each regime: price setting in region 1 and in region 2, and determining the amount of transmission it will use. The monopolist perfectly foresees how consumers and arbitrageurs (if they are present) will react to his decisions. If arbitrageurs are present, they trade transmission capacity until the price for transmission is equal to the price difference between the regions.
The incumbent player is active in both markets and has marginal production cost c H in region 1 and c L in region 2 (c H -c L = Δc > 0). Transportation from region 2 to region 1 is costless, 9 but limited by the thermal transmission constraint k of the transmission line that connects both regions. If the demand for transportation is larger than the capacity of the line, it becomes a scarce good with a positive price. The price of the transmission rights will be denoted by t. Access to the transmission line is sold at a price t and the monopolist and 9. We neglect the losses on the network.
arbitrageurs -in case they are present -buy x M and x A transmission rights with x M + x A ≤ k. The monopolist maximizes profit by setting the price p i in region i, and by transporting x M from region 2 to region 1. 10 When it takes its decisions it will foresee the reactions of arbitrageurs and consumers. Their reaction will determine the price for transmission t and the amount of transmission rights arbitrageurs buy, x A .
The resulting price is different for the two access regimes:
In the access regime without arbitrage (NA), the monopolist is the sole user of transmission capacity (x A NA = 0). As there are no arbitrageurs, there is no upward pressure on the transmission price, which is therefore zero (t NA = 0). As a consequence, the monopolist uses the entire transmission capacity to import cheap units from the low-cost region (x M = k).
In the access regime with arbitrage (A), arbitrageurs will trade energy until the price for transmission capacity is equal to the price difference (t A = Δp ≡ p 1 -p 2 ), and will buy all transmission capacity that is left on the market by the monopolist (
The profit of the monopolist is equal to the revenue from selling s i , minus the production cost of producing r i in region i, minus the transmission cost:
(1) Sales in region 1 are provided by producing r i locally and by importing x M units from region 2 (s 1 = r 1 + x M ). Sales in region 2 are equal to the production in region 2, minus the export to region 1 (s 2 = r 2 -x M ). In addition, the monopolist needs to pay t t x M for obtaining the transmission rights. The sales s 1 in region 1 are equal to the demand in region 1 minus the amount that arbitrageurs import into region 1.
(2)
The sales s 2 in region 2 are equal to the demand in region 2 plus the amount that arbitrageurs export from region 2. (3) 10. Alternatively, we could build a model where the monopolist has three different decision variables: setting the amount of electricity it sells in each region and determining how much it will transport. However, the results would not change.
11. We assume that both the energy market and the transmission market clear simultaneously and therefore do not model the micro-structure of the electrical energy-and the transmission markets. Joskow and Tirole (2000) describe the effect of different auction mechanisms for allocating transmission capacity.
Equations (2) and (3) describe the sales of the incumbent. In the absence of arbitrage (x A = 0), the market is "sealed". The monopolist could set any price in the two markets, without having leakage from one market to the other. With arbitrage, however, some "leakage" will occur, since arbitrageurs will buy electricity in the low-price region and sell it in the high-price region. This formulation is similar to Varian (1985) .
Rewriting the monopolist's profit in equation (1), by assuming binding transmission capacity (x M + x A = k), and taking relations (2) and (3) into account, we obtain:
This formulation is similar to the classical third-degree discrimination model. However, it includes three extra terms. Producing goods in the low-cost region reduces total costs for the monopolist. Given the "leakage", the monopolist loses profitable sales in the high-priced region, and these losses cannot be made up by selling more in the low-priced region. The last term is the monopolist's cost of buying transmission rights.
ANALYSIS
This section derives the strategy of the incumbent under the two access regimes, and describes how the monopolist adjusts his strategy in response to arbitrage. We show the following: the monopolist understands that with arbitrage, price discrimination is less profitable (equation 4), as leakage will occur (x A ≥ 0) and transportation will become costly (t = Δp). Therefore, the incumbent decides to reduce the interregional price difference, reducing both the leakage and transportation costs. We now discuss both pricing strategies in turn.
Exclusive Use by the Incumbent
In the first case, the incumbent has exclusive access to the line. The monopolist maximizes his profit (4) by choosing the prices p i in region i and transporting the amount x M . As transmission capacity is small, the monopolist will use all available capacity of the line to substitute expensive generation in region 1 with cheap generation in region 2 (x M = k). The profit equation simplifies to:
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The prices set by the monopolist p 1 NA and p 2 NA are determined by the standard inverse elasticity rule: (6) (7) with e i = -p i (q' i (p i )/q i (p i )) denoting the demand elasticity in region i. Hence, without arbitrage, regional prices are equal to the local monopoly prices, taking local production costs into account:
Market Allocation of Transmission
In the second case, arbitrageurs can obtain access to the line and buy transmission capacity. This case is denoted A (arbitrage). Again, the monopolist maximizes profit (4) by setting the price p i and choosing x M . In the case where there is arbitrage, the price for transmission t is equal to the regional price difference Δp.
It can be shown that the monopolist finds it in his own interest to set a positive price difference Δp > 0, as long as transmission capacity is sufficiently small and as long as the monopoly price in the high-cost region is higher than the monopoly price in the low-cost region
. This assumption ensures that arbitrageurs and the incumbent have an incentive to trade in the same direction. The monopolist wants to transport energy from the low-cost region to the high-cost region, and the arbitrageurs from the low-price to the high-price region. 13 The assumption that the monopoly price in the high-cost region is high, is valid when the demand function is concave and similar in both regions. (6) and (7) are necessary and sufficient conditions for the prices set by the monopolist, as the optimization problem of the monopolist is not convex. The authors will provide a copy of the proofs on the second order conditions to interested readers.
It is not obvious that Equations
13. If the monopolist sets a negative price difference (Δp≤0), arbitrageurs would trade in the opposite direction (export energy from the high-cost region and import it to the low-cost region) and x A A = -k -x M ≤ 0. As a result, the objective of the monopolist (Equation 4) has to be adjusted. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the first order conditions to be valid can be obtained from the authors.
Arbitrageurs will buy all remaining transmission capacity x A = k -x M to arbitrage away price differences. Hence, the transmission capacity is binding (x A + x M = k). The profit of the monopolist can be rewritten as follows: (10) Clearly, this objective function depends on p 1 and p 2 . Changing the price p i impacts not only the regional profits q i (p i )(p i -c j ), but also the total transmission cost kt.
14 The monopolist will set the prices p 1 A and p 2 A according to an adjusted standard inverse elasticity rule:
The relative price-cost margin is equal to the inverse of the elasticity multiplied by a correction factor: the ratio of local production r i and local consumption q i .
Price Effects
This section compares the prices set by the monopolist under both access regimes, and shows that arbitrage will induce the monopolist to reduce the regional price difference for a small transmission capacity k → 0. The argument goes as follows: in the extreme case of zero transmission capacity (k = 0), local production is equal to local consumption (r i = q i in equations (11) and (12)). According to equations (6), (7), (11) and (12), the profit-maximizing prices are identical in both access regimes, and are equal to the local monopoly prices:
A marginal increase of transmission capacity away from zero does not affect prices in the no-arbitrage regime. This is not the case when arbitrageurs are active, as:
14. Note that the total cost of transmission for the monopolist amounts to x M t + x A Δp = kt, regardless of whoever uses the line: if the monopolist buys transmission capacity, he has to pay x M t. If arbitrageurs buy capacity, the monopolist will sell x A more in the low-price region, but lose x A in the high-price region.
(15) (16) with E i = -(q i p i (q i )'' / p i (q i )') the relative curvature coefficient (or adjusted concavity) of the demand function in region i. Hence, for concave functions, the price in the low-price region 2 increases and the price in the high-price region 1 decreases when transmission capacity increases. If the transmission capacity is small, then price arbitrage reduces the price difference between the regions, compared to the case without arbitrage.
WELFARE
Highlighted in this section are three contributions made by this paper to the third-degree price discrimination literature. First of all, we prove that for the electricity market, the effect of arbitrage is no longer the combination of only an allocational and an output effect, but that also a third effect needs to be taken into account: the production effect. Then, contrary to the standard results, we show that for linear demand functions, arbitrage is often welfare decreasing, because production efficiency is reduced. It is the case when demand functions are similar and cost differences relatively large. Finally, we define necessary and sufficient conditions for welfare to increase under arbitrage for the category of concave demand functions.
Production Efficiency
The welfare effect of arbitrage is the sum of an output effect (how much energy is produced) and the interregional effect, where the latter is the combination of the allocational effect (who consumes the electricity) and the production effect (where is it produced). As long as the transmission line remains congested, arbitrage not only affects the allocation of goods among consumers, but also the location of production. Welfare decreases when electricity is produced less efficiently, by shifting production from the low-cost to the high-cost region.
Define social welfare W as the sum of the net consumer surplus, the producer surplus (the profit of the monopolist) and the revenue of the network operator. This can be written as a function of quantities q 1 , q 2 and transport x = x A + x M : which reduces to the gross consumer surplus U(•) minus production costs:
We say that arbitrage increases interregional efficiency if (keeping total production q = q 1 + q 2 constant) welfare increases with a decrease of the price difference Δp. Mathematically, this is defined as the partial derivative of welfare with respect to the price difference: (17) Note that this partial derivative is taken under the assumption that the transmission line remains congested x = k.
Proposition 1 If transmission capacity is fully used and if the price difference is smaller than the production-cost difference Δp ≤ Δc, then arbitrage decreases interregional efficiency.
Proof. The marginal welfare effect dW in response to a change of the price difference d(Δp) when the transmission line is congested dx = 0, and total production remains constant dq = dq 1 + dq 2 = 0 is proportional to (Δc -Δp):
) > 0. If ρ units of demand are shifted from region 1 to region 2, then also ρ units of production need to be shifted from region 1 to region 2, as the transmission capacity is assumed to be binding. At the margin, consumer surplus decreases by ρΔp, and production costs decrease by ρΔc. Combining equation (18) with the result of section 4.3 (arbitrage reduces the regional price difference Δp), proves the proposition. n Proposition 1 shows that interregional efficiency is achieved when the production effect and the allocation effect are balanced: the gain of consumer surplus is equal to the loss of production efficiency. Although arbitrage reduces the price difference, which improves the allocation of consumption, it may also worsen the allocation of production. In the optimum, demand and production should be allocated such that the price difference equals the cost difference.
Welfare Effects for Linear Demand
This section examines the welfare effects of arbitrage when the demand functions are linear and take the form q i (p) = a i -b i p with a i > 0 and b i > 0. We use the linear model to illustrate the proposition we derived in the previous section. The advantage of using linear functions is that the output effect is zero (Robinson, 1933) , which allows us to concentrate on the interregional effects of arbitrage.
Proposition 2 Proof. Recall from section 5.1 that interregional efficiency requires the price difference to be equal to the cost difference between the two regions Δp opt = Δc. The price difference under no arbitrage (NA) is below the socially optimal price difference:
The intuition for this is that the monopolist will not fully pass along an increase in production costs to consumers. As arbitrage makes price discrimination costly for the monopolist, the monopolist will react by decreasing the price difference. Therefore, as the price difference is already too low, arbitrage lowers the interregional efficiency and hence (as there is not output effect) lowers welfare. n In contrast to the standard literature (Robinson, 1933) , we have shown that arbitrage decreases welfare for linear demand functions when consumers have similar preferences, production-cost differences matter and transmission capacity is binding.
The following corollary shows that allowing for arbitrage makes sense only when the market power of the incumbent is broken in at least one of the two regions:
Corollary 3 If there is perfect competition in the low-cost region and linear demand in both regions, then arbitrage is always beneficial.
Proof. If there is perfect competition in the low-cost region 2, then the residual demand function for the monopolist is perfectly elastic b 2 → ∞, and the price in the low-cost region is a 2 /b 2 = c L . The price in the high-cost region 1 is always above c H . Arbitrage gives an incentive to decrease the price difference between the regions, and hence decreases the price in region 1, which is always optimal. n
Welfare and Output Effect for Non-linear Demand
When demand is non-linear, the monopolist will not only change the price difference in response to arbitrage, but will also adjust total production. This section derives the output and welfare effects of arbitrage for concave demand functions and for small transmission capacities.
Output Effect

Proposition 4 Arbitrage increases total output for transmission capacities close to zero (k → 0), if and only if demand in the low-cost region is more concave, i.e. when (19)
where denotes the adjusted concavity.
Proof. When transmission capacity, then the total level of production does not depend on the access regime, and without arbitrage increasing the size of the transmission capacity does not change total production. Hence, arbitrage increases total output if and only if where q i l (k) ≡ q i (p i l (k)) the demand in region i when the monopolist sets prices p i l (k) under regime l. Using the Taylor approximation for small k → 0 and substituting equations (15) and (16), arbitrage increases output if Rearranging this expression gives the proof of the proposition. n Hence, the output effect depends crucially on the curvature of the demand functions and we obtain similar results as in the standard model on third-degree price discrimination (Robinson, 1933) . We do not derive results for larger transmission capacities, as this would require assumptions on even higher order derivatives of the demand functions and would not provide any additional intuition.
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Welfare Effect
In sections 5.1. and 5.2., we showed that arbitrage might decrease interregional efficiency and that an increase of total output is therefore no longer a sufficient condition for welfare to increase under arbitrage. Arbitrage will increase welfare only when a large increase in output offsets the reduction of interregional efficiency.
Proposition 5 Define the function with as the demand elasticity in region i. Arbitrage increases welfare for transmission capacities close to zero (k → 0) if and only if (20)
Proof. In response to arbitrage, the incumbent change regional production levels, while maintaining congestion on the transmission line. For small transmission capacities, the welfare effect of arbitrage is therefore:
The two terms describe the effect on welfare in each of the regions. Arbitrage is welfare-improving if and only if (21) Here we also use the relation between the relative price-cost margin and the demand elasticity, as given by the first-order conditions (11) and (12). n Hence, in order to evaluate the welfare effect of arbitrage, one needs to compare the regional demand functions with respect to three factors: the curvature of demand (which determines the output effect), the regional price level (which determines the allocational effect), and the elasticity of demand (which determines the price-cost margin, and therefore (indirectly) the production effect).
For equal regional demand functions, the following corollary immediately follows:
Corollary 6 If the low-cost region is more elastic, more concave, and has a lower monopoly price, then arbitrage increases welfare. This generalizes corollary 3.
In order to illustrate the results of this corollary, assume identical quadratic demand functions for both regions . In this model, arbitrage will always increase total output. This is a direct consequence of proposition 4 and the fact that p M (c L ) < p M (c H ) and dE(p)/dp > 0. However, even though total output increases, welfare might actually decrease.
Arbitrage will reduce welfare as long as the coefficient g of the second-order term is sufficiently small , which ensures that . 16 For low g the positive output effect is dominated by a reduction of interregional efficiency. For large values of g, arbitrage might increase or decrease welfare, and no general conditions (which are independent on the regional cost differences) can be formulated.
ExTENSIONS
Oligopolistic Market Structure
The preceding results are based on a simplified model with a monopolist active in both markets. We looked at two extreme situations: perfect arbitrage and no arbitrage. In this section we relax those assumptions and show that our results still hold if we assume that n symmetric players operate each in both markets, and arbitrage is imperfect. With imperfect arbitrage we assume that the price for transmission is equal to θ(p 1 -p 2 ), with θ ∈ [0,1] describing the degree of arbitrage. 17 The behavior of the n firms can be modeled as a Cournot game. For simplicity, we restrict ourselves to linear demand functions.
16. For the quadratic demand function, if and only if . Arbitrage will certainly reduce welfare if this condition holds for all p≥0.
17. Previously, θ was equal to 0 in the absence of arbitrage and equal to 1 in case of perfect arbitrage.
Also in the n firm case total output is independent on the degree of arbitrage. There are, thus, no output effects. However, the regional price difference depends on the degree of arbitrage:
As shown in Section 5.1, the price difference should be equal to the cost difference in the welfare optimum. If demand functions are very similar (a 1 -a 2 < Δc), then the price difference is too small. As the degree of arbitrage θ in our market improves, the price difference decreases even more (dΔp/dθ < 0) and this reduces total welfare.
Hence, for small transmission capacities, the marginal effect of arbitrage on welfare is negative if demand functions are similar.
Note, however, that the welfare effects of arbitrage become less pronounced as markets become more competitive:
In the extreme case of perfect competition (n → ∞) prices are equal to the optimal level (Δp = Δc) and arbitrage does no longer affect welfare.
A Three-region Model
Until now we have studied a model with only two regions and one congested transmission line. This subsection generalizes our approach to three regions (i = 1, 2, 3). See Figure 1 . As before, marginal production cost are c H and c L in region 1 and 2, and a transmission line with capacity k connects both regions. We add a third region that is connected by a transmission line with region 1 and with region 2. In region 3, the monopolist has a production plant with marginal cost c O with c O < c L < c H and production capacity Q 3 .
The three transmission lines have the same electrical characteristics (electrical impedance). Hence if one unit of power is transported from region 2 to region 1, 2∕3 of the flow will pass over line 1 → 2, while 1∕3 of the flow will pass over the lines 1 → 3 and 3 → 2, as the electrical path 1 → 3 → 2 is twice as long as the direct path 1 → 2. Hence, the maximal flow from region 2 to region 1 is equal to 3/2k.
Without arbitrage, the monopolist minimizes its total production costs, subject to transmission and production constraints, and in each region it sets marginal revenue equal to its marginal opportunity costs of energy.
Once arbitrage is introduced, the monopolist can no longer set the price in region 3 freely, as arbitrage requires that p 3 (q 3 ) = 1/2 (p 1 (q 1 ) + p 2 (q 2 )). This condition stems from the fact that with three or more regions, loop flows occur.
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This restriction reduces the profit of the monopolist. Also, the monopolist has to pay for using the congested transmission line. The total payment is, as before, equal to total level of transportation between the region 1 and 2 times the price difference: (3/2)k (p 1 -p 2 ). Once again, arbitrage gives the monopolist an incentive to reduce the price difference Δp = p 1 -p 2 .
Also in the three node model, arbitrage has no effect on total output, as demand functions are linear. Apart from a zero output effect, arbitrage has mainly two effects on welfare. Arbitrage generally improves the allocation of consumption by ensuring that p 3 = 1/2 (p 1 + p 3 ). This has a positive effect on welfare as long as demand functions are different. On the other hand, arbitrage tends to reduce the price difference (Δp = p 1 -p 2 ). For equal demand functions (a i = a and b i = b), the second effect has a negative effect on welfare, as it reduces the price difference below the optimal level, while the first effect is zero. If demand 18 . If the line between 2→3 (resp. 3→1) is limited, then the arbitrage condition would become p 1 (q 1 ) = (p 2 (q 2 ) + p 3 (q 3 ))/2 (resp. p 2 (q 2 ) = (p 1 (q 1 ) + p 3 (q 3 ))/2)) but this choice does not influence the insights of this section. We therefore conclude that the effects of arbitrage on welfare we derive in this paper are more general and not restricted to the particular choice of a simple 2-node structure. However, a market design that takes into account loopflows, will make the positive welfare effects of arbitrage more likely.
Application
We illustrate our results with a discussion of the Belgian and Dutch market power markets, which were integrated in November 2006.
Although cross border transmission capacity was auctioned before 2006, arbitrage between the Belgian and the Dutch power markets remained limited: Market rules were not harmonized; owners of transmission capacity had to nominate capacity before the power markets cleared, and only the Netherlands had an established electricity spot market, the Amsterdam Power Exchange (APX). Belgium did not have a power exchange and arbitrage was risky, as it was hard for arbitrageurs to find counterparties in Belgium. In November 2006 an institutional reform took place. The Belgian Power Exchange, BELPEX, was established and "market coupling" was introduced between BELPEX and the APX. With "market coupling" the network operators and the two power exchanges collaborate to ensure that cross-border arbitrage is perfect, i.e. that the transmission price is equal to the regional power price difference.
Congestion between Belgium and the Netherlands is most pronounced during peak hours. The direction of the transits is predominantly northbound, from Belgium to the Netherlands. See Table 1 . 19 For our discussion we therefore concentrate on peak hours and on northbound congestion.
The direction of the transits has remained fairly constant. Before market coupling, flows were northbound 85% of the time, and 81% afterwards. However, the amount of congestion has reduced significantly as a result of introducing market coupling. The line was congested for 88% of the time when flows were northbound before market coupling, while only for 32% afterwards. During periods with congestion the average transmission price dropped from 8.06 EUR/ MWh to 7.01 EUR/MWh. The reduction of congestion is consistent with the strategic effects we considered in our paper: in response to arbitrage the price difference and the number of hours with congestion decreases.
The potential welfare effects of improving arbitrage can be predicted along the intuition derived in this paper. We conclude that market coupling has likely increased welfare as it has significantly reduced congestion on the border. During 56% of the periods with northbound flows, arbitrage eliminated congestion and welfare therefore increased (if the output effect can be neglected). Additionally, market coupling allowed for "netting" cross border flows, in effect allowing for a more efficient use of the transmission line. During 32% of the time, the line remained congested. Below we argue that during those hours arbitrage has probably reduced welfare.
Above we showed that in situations with congested transmission lines, welfare will be higher if the price difference is closer to the production cost difference (see equation (17)). This result is independent on the type of competition one assumes. In other words, if we find that during congested hours then welfare after market coupling has decreased during these hours.
Belgium and the Netherlands use respectively coal and gas fired power plants as marginal production units during peak hours. With an average CO 2 price of 17 EUR ∕ton, 20 and using average import fuel prices for Germany 21 as a proxy for fuel prices in Belgium and the Netherlands, marginal costs are up to 17 EUR ∕ MWh higher in the Netherlands than in Belgium (c NL -c BE = 17 EUR/ MWh), 22 which is larger that the price difference before market coupling (8 EUR ∕ MWh). Arbitrage reduced the price difference (from 8 to 7 EUR ∕ MWh) and thus welfare during congested hours (32% of northbound flows).
The fact that the price difference is smaller than the cost difference also implies that price cost margins in the Netherlands are smaller than in Belgium.
London Economics (2007) estimated mark-ups in the Dutch market to be relatively low (a Lerner index of 6%) and even to be negative during some 20. Source: European Energy Exchange. 21. Source: Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie. 22. The actual cost difference depends on the actual demand realization, the availability of production capacity and import and export quantities to third countries, in particularly Germany and France. periods. 23 London Economics did not report price cost margins for Belgium, as there was insufficient price data on the Belgian power market to make reliable estimates of price-cost margins. 24 Estimates of the price cost margin for Belgium market have therefore to be taken with caution. Given that the average markup in the four countries studied by London Economics was 16%, and the fact that the Belgian market is highly concentrated (HHI for Belgium is 8300), our assumption that mark-ups in Belgium are higher than in the Netherlands, seems to be justified. Note that Smeers (2005) has criticized the use of optimization models, such as they are used in the London Economics study, for not reflecting the full costs of electricity production (and neglecting some opportunity costs).
To sum up, we think that market coupling has increased overall welfare, but to a smaller extend than one would assume by looking only at price data while neglecting the production costs. Extending market coupling to include Germany is even more likely to increase welfare as in a meshed network, not all transmission lines will be congested at the same time. Arbitrage over uncongested lines will improve allocative efficiency.
CONCLUSION
This paper analyzes third-degree price discrimination in electricity markets. It develops a model in which a monopolist sells a final good in two regional markets, transmission capacity between regions is limited and production costs are high in one of the regions. We investigate whether access to the transmission capacity should be auctioned in order to facilitate regional arbitrage, or whether the dominant incumbent firm should have the exclusive usage rights.
We show that the results of the classical third-degree price-discrimination model do not hold for electricity markets. The classical model identifies two effects of arbitrage on social welfare: the allocational effect and the output effect. Allocational efficiency requires that marginal willingness to pay be equalized across regions. Therefore, for a given total output, arbitrage ensures an efficient allocation of this output as regional price differences disappear. On the other hand, total output may increase or decrease as a result of arbitrage, where an increase is associated with higher social welfare. For electricity markets we identify a third welfare effect of arbitrage: production efficiency. Arbitrage may therefore reduce production efficiency, as less electricity is produced in the low-cost region.
With regard to linear demand, the classical model shows that arbitrage increases welfare, as total output remains constant, but that the reduction of 23. The Dutch generation market has, for continental Europe, a relatively low concentration level. There are 4 large producers and a number of smaller generators using combined heat and power plants (CHPs).
24 (London Economics, 2007, p.18-20) . regional price differences increases allocational efficiency. In electricity markets, arbitrage will reduce welfare if cost differences are important.
Regarding concave demand functions, the paper then derives necessary and sufficient conditions for welfare to increase with arbitrage. It is shown that arbitrage increases welfare when the low-cost region has a more elastic and less concave demand function and a lower autarky price.
The paper is important for obtaining a better understanding of the different trade-offs in electricity markets: creating markets for transmission capacities might create potential efficiency losses within the incumbent production firm, but at the same time improve the allocation of output among consumers. The paper also contributes to the policy debate of electricity market liberalization worldwide. This is certainly the case for Europe, given the particular liberalization method that was used by the European Commission. The Commission started the liberalization under the assumption that by improving access to the transmission access of the transmission network, it could create sufficient (international) competition in the wholesale generation market. 25 The Commission did not require member states to improve the market structure. Hence, incumbent generators remained dominant. It further decided to rely solely on standard competition rules under Article 82 to address abuse of market power, and not to foresee additional regulatory instruments. Competitive markets were, however, not achieved. In this paper, we show that the introduction of market mechanisms for the allocation of essential facilities might have worked counterproductive, given that there is insufficient investment in new transmission capacities and that the market power of the incumbents is not reduced. As the addition of transmission capacity is only a long term solution, we would advise the Commission to use additional regulatory instruments to address market power. 26 
